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ABSTRACT
Apocalyptic groups have launched attacks in the past, which if 
competently executed, would have been catastrophic. The security 
community needs a greater understanding of when law enforcement 
or the military should intercept dangerous apocalyptic groups. This 
comparative case analysis explores the length of time apocalyptic groups 
remain in existence, and when, during their life-span, they cross the 
threshold to catastrophic violence. The apocalyptic groups examined in 
this paper are centrally focused on the expectation of end-times or they 
seek to catalyze its arrival in ways that offend laws or social norms
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INTRODUCTION
Apocalyptic movements are security threats because they are prone 
to seek catastrophic effects on society.1 A greater understanding of 
when to interdict these groups is important because they have launched 
attacks in the past, which if competently executed, would have been 
catastrophic.2 Failure to understand the developmental trajectory of these 
groups creates a reactionary orientation to them and leaves security to 
chance that these groups will not be competent in the future to execute a 
catastrophic attack. A better understanding of apocalyptic group life span 
is necessary to decide when to engage these groups. 
Engaging apocalyptic groups can be fraught with peril because these 
groups have a readiness to see law enforcement intervention as fulfillment 
of their prophecies.3 The apocalyptic believer may see law enforcement 
intervention as fulfillment of apocalyptic expectations and reason for 
all-out resistance or the execution of latent terrorist plans. Understanding 
apocalyptic group life span will provide perspective on when and how 
to approach these groups. Further delineation in this regard is necessary 
because these groups do not represent a uniform typology. Apocalyptic 
groups can be inwardly destructive instead of outwardly destructive, or 
they may have a defensive orientation rather than an offensive orientation 
as they await their apocalyptic moment in time.  
The purpose of this comparative case analysis is to explore the length of 
time apocalyptic groups remain in existence, and when, during their life 
span, they cross the threshold to catastrophic violence. This study defines 
apocalyptic group life span as extending from the group’s inception 
(the year the group emerged) to its end (the year the group dissolved). 
Hypotheses generated from the cases can inform the conceptualization of 
apocalyptic groups and their proclivity to launch catastrophic attacks. The 
research questions ask, “What is the typical life-span of an apocalyptic 
group?” and “When is the best time for the security community to 
interdict these groups before they attempt a catastrophic attack?” 
The scope of this study is broad. Apocalyptic groups, also known as 
millenarian groups, can range from benign to lethal. The term apocalyptic 
refers to what will happen at the end of time, which is usually some 
catastrophe, such as a large war or a natural disaster.4 The term 
millenarianism refers to what is to come after—and as a function of—the 
apocalypse, which is a time of perpetual peace and resolution of perennial 
difficulties.5 Groups with an apocalyptic worldview include religious sects, 
cults, and terrorist organizations. This study does not consider those 
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world religions that observe end times eschatology to be apocalyptic. 
Rather, apocalyptic groups examined in this article focus centrally on 
the expectation of end-times or seek to catalyze its arrival in ways that 
offend laws or social norms. This may include sects or splinter groups of 
the major world religions, but the world religions have messages beyond 
apocalyptic thinking, and are not examined in this study.
The hypotheses generated from this study have implications throughout 
the security community. Military and intelligence stakeholders can 
benefit from this article, as can various levels of law enforcement. Military 
and intelligence stakeholders will likely discover the results useful if 
planning to engage an organization with an apocalyptic worldview. 
A contemporary example is the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
which is a militant apocalyptic group.6 Understanding the developmental 
trajectories of apocalyptic groups may offer insight into early warnings 
and indications, which could provide the upper hand in anticipating an 
attack.  
WHY STUDY APOCALYPTIC GROUPS? 
The rationale for this study is based on the observation that many 
apocalyptic groups are not rational actors amenable to deterrence 
strategies.7 This observation reflects a rational choice model, which 
posits that rational actors seek to maximize personal utility net of cost.8 
Apocalyptic groups, according to this model, are likely to be unresponsive 
to the typical levers of power because they actively anticipate a 
catastrophic confrontation where their net loss is unsustainable. Greater 
understanding of these groups is therefore needed to anticipate their 
behavior. It is a faulty assumption to presume these groups would not 
unleash a mass casualty attack because it would alienate them from some 
constituency. Apocalyptic groups are not necessarily bound to a social 
constituency, so they may not operate according to the same set of 
constraints that impinge upon terrorists who have political ambitions.
The difficulty al-Qaeda core had in controlling Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s 
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) illustrates the dialectic between terrorist groups 
with a strategic agenda and those with an apocalyptic ideology. Zarqawi 
was reluctant to swear allegiance to al-Qaeda, and after he did, al-Qaeda 
leadership frequently scorned him for taking actions, such as targeting 
Shiites, in furtherance of his apocalyptic vision rather than remaining 
in close consort with al-Qaeda core’s strategic mission.9 Zarqawi’s 
steadfastness in maintaining true to his apocalyptic ideology despite 
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it drawing the scorn of al-Qaeda leadership illustrates the importance 
of understanding apocalyptic thinking within the context of terrorist 
organizations. As AQI demonstrated, terrorist groups with an apocalyptic 
vision can act as jihadist free riders who partake in the jihadist global 
insurgency but who will act in furtherance of their apocalyptic vision 
irrespective of any larger, coordinated jihadist strategy.
Apocalyptic group research has a gap in the literature that overlooks 
the life span of these organizations. Though scholars have noted that 
these groups do not fit into a rational-actor model and that the whim of 
a charismatic leader often drives them, there is a dearth of literature on 
what these groups look like from their inception to their end.10 There is no 
clear delineation of critical milestones in the development of these groups 
that may forewarn of catastrophic action. Failure to understand when 
and why apocalyptic groups take action led to Aum Shinrikyo launching 
chemical and biological attacks across Japan in the 1990’s without 
warning. The only reason these attacks did not produce mass casualties 
was because of Aum Shinrikyo’s incompetence in these endeavors.11 Aum 
Shinrikyo was unable to effectively procure, prepare, package, or deploy 
the botulinum toxin, anthrax, Q fever, Ebola, nuclear explosives, and sarin 
with their intended effects, though the group made persistent attempts. 
Interestingly, Aum Shinrikyo’s early failures in these endeavors did not 
decisively hone the attention of Japanese authorities, which could have 
interdicted the group before it launched its 1995 sarin attack.12
A greater understanding of apocalyptic groups is particularly important 
now when globalization is likely to influence millenarian beliefs as cultures 
continue to collide and face fundamental changes or extinction.13 The 
potential therefore exists that more apocalyptic groups may emerge in 
the future. Furthermore, greater understanding of apocalyptic group 
behavior is relevant to the current terrorist threat from the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Islamic State is an apocalyptic group that 
has already shown that it is not averse to committing mass atrocities.14 
The rapid dissolution of the ISIS caliphate in the Middle East will leave 
the group desperate for a dramatic impact, so understanding the 
group’s behavior as it relates to its apocalyptic mindset may help avert a 
catastrophic attack in the future.
APOCALYPTIC CONTEXT
Apocalyptic and millenarian movements have occurred throughout 
history. These movements occur outside the context of cults or terrorist 
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organizations as well as within them.15 Apocalyptic thinking is found in 
cultures, societies, or groups that experience oppressive conditions or 
social decay.16 Oppressed groups, such as the colonized Incan civilization 
of the sixteenth century and the indigent members of People’s Temple 
of the twentieth century, may look to apocalyptic visions for hope, while 
those that experience social decay may look to apocalyptic visions for a 
corrective solution to seemingly permanent immoral behavior. The need 
for an absolute end to a hopeless state of affairs and a corresponding 
renewal sets the stage for the anticipated cosmic war that is common to 
apocalyptic movements. The cosmic war motif describes an epic, divinely 
authorized battle between good and evil in a world gone awry.17 This motif 
is identifiable in the way diverse groups of apocalyptic terrorists view the 
world, including Sikhs in India, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, Kach in Israel, and 
Islamic groups in the Middle East.18
Apocalyptic terrorism gained greater attention in the 1990’s.19 The 
distinction between this type of terrorism and the more traditional 
terrorism was becoming clearer as the new millennium approached. The 
greatest distinction seemed to lie in the desire of apocalyptically inspired 
terrorists to destroy the existing order and to engage in indiscriminate 
killing to do so. These new terrorists were increasingly dangerous because 
the sociopolitical restraints that kept the old terrorists in check no longer 
applied.20 These new terrorists were only accountable to their deity, so the 
amount of carnage they could theoretically inflict was difficult to estimate 
but extensive if they were to acquire WMD. Despite the apprehension 
caused by the emergence of apocalyptic inspired terrorists at the end of 
the twentieth century, this sort of terrorist was still considered to be in the 
minority and their threat was even considered to be overstated by serious 
thinkers in the field.21
Cults that hold apocalyptic beliefs can also be dangerous because they 
see the world in dichotomous terms, their judgment is blinded, and, 
to them, the law is relative.22 Apocalyptic cults form the basis of their 
worldviews by distorting the writings found in the major religions or 
other systems of belief. For example, People’s Temple and the Branch 
Davidians distorted the Christian religion, while Heaven’s Gate based its 
actions on belief in UFO’s. Cults with an apocalyptic vision, and terrorist 
groups for that matter, have a greater proclivity for violence when led by 
a charismatic-millenarian leader.23   
Cults, or New Religious Movements (NRM), tend to synthesize different 
religious and philosophical traditions to create their own atmosphere of 
community, belief, and emotional gratification.24 The proliferation of cults 
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is the result of cultural integration, transformation, and globalization.25 
Cults offer psychological and social rewards for people with vulnerabilities 
in psychosocial areas who are left confused by the disorganization 
created by a rapidly changing society.26 The potential for violence exists 
with cults when the cult leadership or vision is questionable.
CASES
Peoples Temple 
Jim Jones founded People’s Temple in 1956 with a group of 20 followers.27 
Jones was a charismatic leader who engaged in physical, sexual, and 
psychological abuse of his followers. After ongoing media scrutiny, Jones 
moved his group to Guyana where People’s Temple owned land. In April 
of 1978, a group of “Concerned Relatives” officially accused Jim Jones 
of human rights violations.28 In November 1978, US Congressman Leo 
Ryan arrived at Jonestown with members of the media and Concerned 
Relatives to investigate his constituency’s claims about the cult. The 
delegation publicly questioned Jones, and some cult members chose to 
defect and leave with the delegation. On November 18, 1978, members of 
People’s Temple attacked the delegation at the airstrip as it was leaving 
Guyana, which resulted in five dead and twelve wounded. Later that day, 
Jim Jones ordered his group to drink poisoned cool-aid, resulting in the 
death of 909 people.
Branch Davidians
The Davidians were an offshoot of the Seventh Day Adventist religious 
sect, but the Davidians’ beliefs significantly deviated from their parent 
group throughout the cult’s existence, and even more after Koresh 
assumed leadership of the group. The sect experienced fragmentation 
until 1978, at which time the cult most closely resembled the Branch 
Davidians that Koresh eventually took over. On February 28, 1993, Alcohol 
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) agents deployed to the Branch Davidian 
compound in Waco, Texas, to arrest Koresh on weapons and explosives 
charges.29 A standoff immediately ensued. During negotiations, Koresh 
became uncooperative and preached excessively to the negotiators and 
claimed to have special knowledge of the apocalypse.30 On April 19, 1993, 
a lethal fire erupted in the compound. Arson investigations concluded 
that the fire began in the inside at multiple points of origin with flame 
accelerants applied to instigate the fire.  
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Solar Temple 
Luc Jouret and Joseph Di Mambro founded the Order of the Solar Temple, 
or Solar Temple, in 1986.31 Characterizations of Solar Temple describe 
a cult that was a syncretic mixture of religion, esoteric traditions, and 
paranormal beliefs.32 Jouret proclaimed that the end of the world was 
approaching and only the part of Quebec, Canada, where his group was 
located would survive. On October 4, 1994, Di Mambro had a defector, the 
defector’s wife, and their infant son killed in an eccentric stabbing ritual. 
Twelve hours later, investigators found twenty-two people in Switzerland 
in a burning house—nineteen of whom had a gunshot wound to the head—
and arranged in a star-like ceremonial formation while wearing Solar 
Temple garb. Hours later elsewhere in Switzerland investigators found 
twenty-five bodies dead from injection of poison. All the adults were part 
of the Solar Temple, including Di Mambro and Jouret. Five of the dead 
were children. In December 1995, investigators discovered sixteen people 
in a similar ceremonial lying of bodies with gunshot wounds and set on 
fire. In March 22, 1997, investigators found five more people burned in a 
Solar Temple ritual.
Aum Shinrikyo 
Aum Shinrikyo began in Japan in 1984 as a fifteen-member meditation 
group.33 The guru of the group and its founder was the charismatic Shoko 
Asahara. Aum Shinrikyo began receiving unfavorable media coverage 
as it progressed, and an Aum Shinrikyo Victim’s Society emerged. 
Asahara’s paranoia increased with the activities of the Victim’s Society, 
which prompted him to order members to kill the Victim Society’s 
attorney, Tsutsumi Sakamoto. On November 4, 1989, group members 
killed Sakamoto, but they also killed his wife and child. Asahara continued 
to expand Aum Shinrikyo and sent candidates from the group to seek 
national election in the Japanese government, but they decisively lost at 
the polls.34 After this defeat, Asahara became overtly apocalyptic in his 
thinking. Asahara believed that he had to “liberate” the people by killing 
them or using poison as a societal purgative.
Aum Shinrikyo began its weapons development and procurement 
activities in 1990. At this time, the group attempted to deploy 
the botulinum toxin by driving a vehicle and spraying the toxin 
indiscriminately.35 In 1992, Aum Shinrikyo members traveled to Zaire to 
obtain a culture of the Ebola virus. In 1993, Aum Shinrikyo used a crude 
pumping system to deploy the anthrax toxin from the roof of one of its 
buildings with little success. At around this time, Aum Shinrikyo solicited 
Russian sources for nuclear and chemical weapons, while also searching 
Umbrasas: The Life Course of Apocalyptic Groups
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018
39https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1653
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2
for radioactive material in various locations. Some believe that a Russian 
weapons expert gave the group a blueprint for sarin.36 Aum Shinrikyo 
continued its attacks on opponents during this time and in 1994 released 
sarin near judges who presided over a land dispute case to which Aum 
was a party. Seven people died because of this attack and hundreds 
sustained injuries. On March 20, 1995, Aum Shinrikyo released sarin in a 
Tokyo, Japan, and subway killing thirteen and injuring hundreds of people. 
Surprisingly, Aum Shinrikyo received many protections under Japanese 
law because of its religious classification so the Japanese government 
did not purposely disband Aum Shinrikyo even after its subway attack. 
In 2000, Aum Shinrikyo changed its name to Aleph and underwent a 
significant transformation of its mission and vision. The organization 
known as Aleph is no longer recognizable as Aum Shinrikyo because of 
the significant changes.
Heaven’s Gate 
Bonnie Nettles and Marshall Applewhite founded Heaven’s Gate in 1975.37 
Their ideology was a syncretic version of Revelation theology and UFO 
folklore. Defections occurred within their following as their predictions 
failed to materialize. The rebuke of their prophetic ability prompted the 
group to move into seclusion in Wyoming. The group lived in seclusion 
for sixteen years, and in 1991 resurfaced when it produced a video 
series on humans and UFO’s. In 1993, the group purchased ad space in 
major newspapers and local and alternative periodicals to disseminate 
the group’s message. In 1994, the group made several talks around the 
United States about the importance of joining Heaven’s Gate to ensure a 
proper “exiting.” The group went back into seclusion in 1995 and did not 
have any media attention until March 1997. Starting on March 23, 1997, 
and ending on March 26, 1997, the group committed mass suicide by 
consuming barbiturates with alcohol and asphyxiating themselves. The 
group committed suicide in waves such that the wave to follow the group 
before would clean up after the deceased members and arrange them in 
a ceremonial manner. The group believed that it was departing earth for 
a different level of existence. Thirty-nine people died at the end of the 
group’s mass suicide.
Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments
The Movement for the Restoration for the Ten Commandments began in 
1989 by a few ex-communicated Catholic Church priests and nuns. The 
group’s main belief was to restore the Ten Commandments to its original 
prominence. Joseph Kibwetere was the chief visionary of the group and 
promulgated visions he stated were from heaven. P. M. Venter examined 
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the events surrounding the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten 
Commandments’ implosion that resulted in mass murder-suicide.38 The 
group believed that the world would end on December 31, 1999, and at 
such time all people on earth would perish, while the group members 
would transport to heaven. When the end of the world did not occur 
on December 31 as predicted, Kibwetere changed the date to March 17, 
2000. Venter believes that group members began to question Kibwetere 
when his prediction did not occur, and they requested their money and 
possessions back and their release from the group. Days before March 17, 
2000, the group murdered eight would-be secessionists by blunt trauma 
and poison and dumped their bodies in a mass grave. Their challenge to 
the group leader’s fragile psyche appeared to be a major precipitant to 
Kibwetere’s tragic decision for the group. On March 17, 2000, the group 
entered their church, which already had its windows boarded from the 
outside. Once inside, the members locked the doors and a catastrophic 
explosion occurred that destroyed the church and its members.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi formed al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004 from the 
terrorist network he led since 2000. Zarqawi reluctantly swore allegiance 
to bin Laden and formed AQI. Zarqawi’s group was a major force in the 
Iraq insurgency and quickly gained notoriety from both coalition forces 
and Muslims in Iraq. Zarqawi’s ideology led him to vehemently target 
Shiites and generally have little concern about killing other Muslims in his 
attacks. Zarqawi’s ideology was at odds with the basic tenets of the Iraqi 
nationalist insurgency, which alienated him from other groups in Iraq. 
Zarqawi’s ideology was decidedly apocalyptic. He viewed his participation 
in the Iraq insurgency as part of a cosmic battle between Muslims and 
Byzantine Christians, and he sought to attack Shia Muslims in accordance 
with Sunni apocalyptic prophecy. A coalition forces airstrike killed 
Zarqawi on June 7, 2006. After Zarqawi’s death, AQI’s organizational 
structure became more bureaucratic and institutionalized. The group 
also demonstrated significantly fewer attacks after his death. The Global 
Terrorism Database indicates AQI’s last terrorist attack was on September 
25, 2011.39 After this time, AQI splintered with a significant portion 
becoming the Islamic State in Iraq.
Soldiers of Heaven
The Soldiers of Heaven formed in Najaf, Iraq, in 1990. The group’s leader, 
a messianic figure named Diya Abdul-Zahra Kadhim, wanted to create 
mass violence to bring about the Hidden Imam consistent with Islamic 
theology.40 Some reports suggest that Kadhim believed that he was the 
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Hidden Imam.41 The cult remained obscure to residents of the Najaf area, 
but residents noticed activity within the group increase after the 2003 
Iraq invasion. Iraqi authorities eventually received information that the 
group was planning an attack during the Shiite festival of Ashoura. On 
January 29, 2007, Iraqi forces approached the group’s compound with 
the intention of questioning or arresting members of the group. The Iraqi 
force came under heavy attack when it neared the compound and called 
for coalition support. The battle lasted for twenty-four hours and resulted 
in the death of 350 members of the group.42
METHODS
This study used a comparative case analysis methodology. The 
comparative case method is useful to draw inferences from case-based 
material. The unit of analysis, or case, in this methodology is apocalyptic 
group. There are eight cases in this analysis: People’s Temple, Branch 
Davidians, Solar Temple, Aum Shinrikyo, Heaven’s Gate, Movement 
Restoration, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and Soldiers of Heaven. The cases inform 
seven variables. The variables examined are Years Existing, Years to 
Violence, Violence Precipitant, Violent Action, Total Deaths from First 
Mass Violence Episode, Precipitant to Dissolution, End of Group.
This study used a purposive sampling method of case selection. Purposive 
sampling is useful for selecting information-rich cases that allow 
exploration of the phenomena under study and subsequent comparison 
and contrast of the phenomena.43 Exploring books, journals, websites, 
and search engines identified cases. The cases in this study had the 
following characteristics: Apocalyptic thinking central to group; group 
committed mass violence; group has terminated. The tendency for some 
apocalyptic groups to linger rather than to dissolve prohibited them from 
inclusion. For instance, the Israeli apocalyptic terrorist group Kach has not 
committed a large-scale terrorist attack since 1994, but there is indication 
that the group still exists.44 Since there is no reported end date for Kach, it 
was not included in the case analysis.45 
The cases selected for exploration were modern apocalyptic groups. 
Modern apocalyptic groups are more likely to share cohort effects, so 
the data they yield may be of greater benefit to hypotheses about other 
contemporary apocalyptic groups. This study used explanation building 
to analyze the data. Explanation building starts with observations and 
creates an understanding of what is happening with the data and why.46 
This study also used an interpretive approach to understand the motives 
driving each case.47
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Coding
Years Existing is simply the amount of years the group has been active 
from its beginning year to its ending year. Years to Violence is the 
amount of time that transpired from the group’s beginning to its first 
episode of mass violence. This study defines mass violence as the killing, 
or attempted killing, of three or more people at one time. Violence 
Precipitant is the event that stands in temporal relation to the mass 
violence. Type of Violent Action is the characterization of the violence 
that occurred. Number Deaths First Mass Violence is the number of 
deaths that occurred during the group’s first episode of mass violence. 
Precipitant Dissolution is the event that temporally preceded the group’s 
dissolution. End of Group is the characterization of the group’s dissolution. 
Table 1 examines these variables in relation to each group.
CASE YEARS EXISTING
YEARS TO 
VIOLENCE
VIOLENCE 
PRECIPITANT
VIOLENT 
ACTION
FIRST 
MASS 
DEATH
PRECIPITANT 
DISSOLUTION
END OF 
GROUP
People’s 
Temple
22 22 Psychological Affront Murder-Suicide 909 Psychological Affront Total 
Dissolution
Branch 
Davidian
15 15 Armed Confrontation Murder-Suicide 80 Armed Confrontation Total 
Dissolution
Solar 
Temple
11 8 Psychological Affront Murder-Suicide 50 Psychological Affront Drain of 
Members
Aum 
Shinrikyo
16 5 Psychological Affront Murder 3 Legal Sanctions Splinter
Heaven’s 
Gate
22 22 Enactment of End Plan Suicide 39 Enactment of End Plan Total 
Dissolution
Move 
Restore
11 11 Psychological Affront Murder 8 Psychological Affront Total 
Dissolution
AQI 7 0.7 Enactment of End Plan Murder 11 Death of Key Leader Splinter 
Soldiers 
Heaven
17 17 Armed Confrontation Died Fighting 350 Armed Confrontation Total 
Dissolution 
Table 1. Case Comparison Matrix. 
One limitation to this study relates to a common weakness in the 
comparative case analysis design—external validity. External validity 
refers to the degree to which findings generalize to other cases. As 
such, caution must be used when attempting to apply findings from the 
cases examined in this study to less similar cases. For instance, activity 
observed in mostly Western apocalyptic groups may not fully generalize 
Source: Author. 
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to non-Western groups. Another limitation to the present study is 
the issue of case selection. The cases examined in this article were 
purposefully selected rather than randomly selected consistent with the 
purposive sampling method.  
RESULTS 
This study examined eight cases. Some of the cases resembled each other 
quite closely, while others appeared different. For example, many of the 
groups had an inward orientation and focused on the intense relationship 
between members of the group and the group leader. People’s Temple 
and Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments resembled 
each other in this manner. Other groups had more of an outward 
orientation and those groups tended towards terrorist and insurgent 
activity, such as Aum Shinrikyo, AQI, and Soldiers of Heaven.
Years in Existence 
The average (mean) years in existence for the apocalyptic groups 
examined in this article is 15.1 years. The shortest existence for an 
apocalyptic group was AQI, which was 7 years. The longest groups in 
existence were People’s Temple and Heaven’s Gate, both of which lasted 
22 years. Table 2 displays the averages for all variables.   
Years to Mass Violence 
The average (mean) years to violence for the groups examined in this 
study were 12.5 years. The group that had the shortest amount of time 
to mass violence was AQI, which was 0.7 years, and the groups with the 
longest time to mass violence were People’s Temple and Heaven’s Gate, 
both of which were 22 years.
Precipitant to Mass Violence 
The most frequently occurring precipitant to violence for the groups 
examined in this article was Psychological Affront (four groups). 
CASE YEARS EXISTING
YEARS TO 
VIOLENCE
VIOLENCE 
PRECIPITANT
VIOLENT 
ACTION
FIRST 
MASS 
DEATH
PRECIPITANT 
DISSOLUTION
END OF 
GROUP
All Cases 15.1 12.5 Psychological Affront Murder-
Suicide; 
Murder
44.5 Psychological Affront Total 
Dissolution
Table 2. Group Averages.
Source: Author.
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Psychological Affront represents a perception based, rather than 
material, threat to the group or its leader. For example, People’s Temple 
experienced a Psychological Affront when Representative Leo Ryan 
visited its compound and publicly questioned the group and its leader. 
This may have left the perception that the group lacked the omnipotence 
that its leader proclaimed it to have. Furthermore, the test of the group 
leader in such a public manner challenged his unquestioned authority. 
The fact that a handful of group members sought to defect with the 
Congressman was a further blow to the perceived omnipotence of the 
group. Even though a handful of members sought to defect, this was not 
a material loss to a group of nearly 1,000 people. The challenge to the 
integrity of the group during this Psychological Affront may have been 
sufficient to destabilize it and precipitate mass murder-suicide.
Other groups’ precipitant to mass violence was Armed Confrontation. 
Armed Confrontation is a confrontation with the group or its leader where 
some armed authority seeks to detain or attack the group or its leader. 
Some groups’ precipitant to mass violence was Enactment of End Plan. 
Enactment of End Plan occurred when the group’s actions followed its 
main objectives. As such, the group simply behaved according to its 
end-plan. Both Heaven’s Gate and AQI had this as a precipitant. Heaven’s 
Gate’s mass suicide was consistent with its plan and AQI’s murderous 
activity was consistent with AQI’s terrorist plans.
Type of Violent Action 
The Type of Violent Action enacted by the apocalyptic groups examined 
in this article was bifurcated. Murder (three groups) and Murder-Suicide 
(three groups) occurred during the groups’ first episodes of mass 
violence. The violent action for one group was strictly suicide and the 
violent action for another group was death in battle.
Total Deaths from First Violent Episode 
The average (median) number of total deaths from the first episode of 
mass violence for the groups examined in this article was 44.5. The range 
for total deaths at the groups’ first episodes was vast and ranged from 
three to 909. This reflects the observation that for some apocalyptic 
groups the whole group perished in the first mass violence episode.
Precipitant to Dissolution 
The most frequently occurring Precipitant to Dissolution for the 
apocalyptic groups examined in this article was Psychological Affront 
(three groups). One hypothesis for this is that a perceived (as opposed 
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to material) threat to the integrity of the group or its leader triggered 
the downfall of these groups. For example, the failed prophecies of 
Movement’s leader caused dissension and defection, and this threat to the 
integrity of the leader and group stimulated mass violence in the form of 
murder of the dissenters and then murder-suicide of the whole group.
Armed Confrontation was the Precipitant to Dissolution for two groups. In 
these cases, Armed Confrontation triggered a final standoff that resulted 
in the group’s downfall. Legal Sanctions was the Precipitant to Dissolution 
for one group, which meant that the legal institutions stimulated the 
group’s downfall. In this case, Japan created laws against Aum Shinrikyo 
and conducted law enforcement operations against the group until it 
splintered. Enactment of End Plan was the Precipitant to Dissolution 
for one group. In this case, Heaven’s Gate began its plan for suicide 
without an outside triggering event and executed the plan until the group 
dissolved. Lastly, Death of Key Leader was the Precipitant to Dissolution 
for one group. In this case, authorities killed Zarqawi and AQI began a 
slow downfall that eventually resulted in its splintering.
End of Group
The most frequently occurring End of Group for the apocalyptic groups 
examined in this article was Total Dissolution (five groups). As such, the 
groups whose End of Group was Total Dissolution experienced a complete 
termination of the group. In effect, the Precipitant to Dissolution led to 
the end of these groups. Splintering was the End of Group for two groups, 
which means that remnants of the group remained after the Precipitant 
to Dissolution and eventually went to other groups. Lastly, the End of 
Group for one group was Drain of Members. This End of Group is the slow 
attrition of members until the group effectively dissolved. In this case, 
Solar Temple became violent and enacted its suicidal mission. However, 
the group dissolved in waves over the course of three years as members 
continued to commit suicide consistent with the group’s plan.
PATTERNS
One pattern borne out of the data was that apocalyptic groups are 
sensitive to Psychological Affront and may act violently in response to it. 
Half of the apocalyptic groups examined in this study precipitated to mass 
violence by Psychological Affront. The result of this can be significant 
as the average number of deaths that occurred because of this type 
of triggering event was 44.5. The targets of this type of violence were 
within and outside of the groups. Evidence of Psychological Affront (for 
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example, leader loss of credibility, defectors) may serve as an indicator of 
potential catastrophic effects.
Another pattern displayed was that most of the apocalyptic groups 
examined in this article (five groups) had their first mass violence episode 
after their first decade of existence. In a sense, these groups seem to 
operate according to the injunction “when the time is right” apocalyptic 
activity will take place. For many groups, the disorganizing effects of a 
Psychological Affront may have fed into the self-referencing tendencies 
of the group and its leader leaving them with the sense that “the time has 
come.” It is also likely that apocalyptic groups become more vulnerable 
to Psychological Affront over the course of time as their prophecies 
do not come true, the fallibility of the leader and group become more 
apparent, and as people begin to experience a change in mind about the 
group. Indeed, the psychosocial crises that tend to propel people toward 
cults may well resolve after a decade, which leaves people interested 
in developing a life outside of the group. This may result in a desire to 
defect, which has been a major element of Psychological Affront. Over 
half of the groups (five groups) precipitated to dissolution by some 
confrontation, either psychological or armed.
Notable differences existed when comparing the apocalyptic groups 
with a terrorist and insurgent orientation (Aum Shinrikyo, AQI, and 
Soldiers of Heaven) with traditional cult apocalyptic groups (People’s 
Temple, Branch Davidians, Solar Temple, Heaven’s Gate, and Movement 
Restoration). Though the average number of years both types of groups 
remained in existence was close (13.3 for terrorist-oriented groups and 
16.2 for traditional groups), a notable difference existed in the time it took 
the groups to engage in mass violence. The terrorist groups averaged 
their first mass violence attack after 7.6 years, while the traditional cult 
groups averaged their first attacks after 15.6 years. There was no clear 
distinguishing precipitant to mass violence for the terrorist groups. This 
contrasted with a clear precipitant to mass violence for the traditional 
groups, which was Psychological Affront.
The type of violence from the terrorist groups was murder, while the type 
of violence from the traditional groups was murder-suicide. Interestingly, 
the average Total Deaths from the first episode of mass violence for the 
terrorist groups (11) was much less than the average for the traditional 
groups (50). There was no clear Precipitant to Dissolution for the terrorist 
groups, while Psychological Affront was the common Precipitant to 
Dissolution for the traditional groups. Two out of the three terrorist 
groups’ end was Splintering, while four out of the five traditional groups’ 
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end was Total Dissolution. Table 3 displays a comparison between 
terrorist orientation and traditional orientation.
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN TERRORIST AND  
TRADITIONAL GROUPS
Despite notable differences between the apocalyptic groups with a 
terrorist orientation and those with a traditional orientation, several 
similarities between the orientations existed. Of the two different 
orientations, Branch Davidians and Soldiers of Heaven have the closest 
resemblance to each other. The two groups had a Years Existing that 
matched their Years to Violence, both had a Violence Precipitant of 
Armed Confrontation, both had a Precipitant to Dissolution of Armed 
Confrontation, and both had an End of Group of Total Dissolution. 
Moreover, each group had a devoutly religious framework (one Islamic 
and one Christian) with a leader who made messianic claims. Despite 
these similarities, the groups’ orientations were vastly different as Soldiers 
of Heaven planned offensive terrorist activities within the context of the 
Iraq insurgency, while Branch Davidians maintained a defensive posture in 
the United States.
Other similarities between the orientations existed too. Al Qaeda in Iraq 
and Heaven’s Gate shared the same Violence Precipitant of Enactment of 
End Plan, and in fact, were the only groups to have that as a precipitant. 
This is especially notable considering that AQI was the most terroristic of 
the groups and Heaven’s Gate was inwardly focused and appeared to be 
the least coercive of the groups. Both groups appeared to execute their 
mission absent any noticeable precipitant. Another similarity between 
the orientations was evident between Aum Shinrikyo and the traditional 
groups in that Aum Shinrikyo had a Violence Precipitant of Psychological 
Affront, as did the traditional groups. These similarities suggest that 
CASE YEARS EXISTING
YEARS TO 
VIOLENCE
VIOLENCE 
PRECIPITANT
VIOLENT 
ACTION
FIRST 
MASS 
DEATH
PRECIPITANT 
DISSOLUTION
END OF 
GROUP
Terrorist 
Apocalyptic
13.3 7.6 Psych; End  
Plan; Armed
Murder 11 Legal; Death 
LDR; Armed
Splinter
Traditional 
Apocalyptic
16.2 15.6 Psychological  
Affront
Murder-Suicide 50 Psychological 
Affront
Total 
Dissolution
Table 3. Comparison of Average Variables by Orientation.
Source: Author.
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despite real differences between the apocalyptic group orientations, 
similar vulnerabilities may exist.
CONCLUSION
One hypothesis to emerge from this study is that traditional apocalyptic 
groups become violent at the end of ten years. Traditional apocalyptic 
groups seem to become more vulnerable to a perceived affront to the 
group’s integrity or to the leader’s integrity around this time. As such, 
routine questioning of a leader or the fostering of defections from the 
group may precipitate catastrophic effects after ten years. An informed 
diplomacy may be useful if law enforcement wants to investigate an 
apocalyptic group after this period. Diplomacy in this manner may entail 
having a credible intermediary foster a connection with the group in a way 
that does not stimulate the group’s psychological vulnerabilities. This may 
prevent a cascade of events that can result in mass murder-suicide if the 
group perceives an imminent threat.
Another hypothesis to emerge from this study is the best time to 
intervene before a terrorist apocalyptic group attempts a catastrophic 
attack may be before the group’s seventh year. There is no clear 
precipitant to a terrorist apocalyptic group’s mass violent attack. 
The three terrorist apocalyptic groups examined in this study all 
had independent precipitating events before they committed mass 
violence. Similarly, this study found no recurring precipitants to terrorist 
apocalyptic group dissolution. There was, however, consistency in the 
way apocalyptic terrorist groups ended—splintering. Therefore, attempts 
to interdict a terrorist apocalyptic group may result in splintering of its 
members. The finding that apocalyptic terrorist groups end by splintering 
is consistent with the findings of Seth Jones and Martin Libicki who 
showed that the most common way religious terrorist groups (of which 
apocalyptic terrorist groups are a subset) dissolve is by splintering.48
One can surmise that apocalyptic terrorist groups differed from 
apocalyptic cults on many of the variables examined in this study because 
of the difference in the groups’ orientations. Apocalyptic terrorist groups 
have a different mission than apocalyptic cults, which helps explain some
 of the group differences. Apocalyptic terrorist groups will seek mass 
violence as an influence tactic that is not necessarily an indication of its 
apocalyptic agenda being set in motion. For example, many of AQI’s 
attacks were in furtherance of the Iraq insurgency and not meant to 
instigate an apocalyptic confrontation, and Aum Shinrikyo disassociated 
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some of its attacks from its larger apocalyptic agenda. This contrasts with 
apocalyptic cults, where the precipitating event to their first mass violence 
episode often resulted in catastrophic effects.
The dissimilarity in missions may result in a heterogeneous composition 
of group members in apocalyptic terrorist groups when compared to 
apocalyptic cults. Apocalyptic terrorist groups likely have a core of 
true believers who operate according to the group’s apocalyptic vision. 
However, it is possible that there are terrorist free riders who may be 
less devoted to an apocalyptic vision and more interested in a terrorist 
and insurgent agenda. Terrorist free riders will probably be less likely 
to see provocations as an apocalyptic sign and they will likely engage 
in terrorist actions that are disassociated from the group’s apocalyptic 
vision. This heterogeneity of group composition shows in AQI, which had 
an apocalyptic core but that recruited and employed secular terrorists.
The different group composition may also help explain the notable 
differences in vulnerability to Psychological Affront between apocalyptic 
terrorist groups and apocalyptic cults. The high vulnerability to 
Psychological Affront seen in apocalyptic cults is likely a function of 
the groups’ dependence on the charismatic leader and the perceived 
omnipotence of the group. The closed society embraced by apocalyptic 
cults leaves its members extremely dependent on the leader and the 
group. Affronts sufficient to pierce through the distorted view held of the 
leader and the group may disrupt the group homeostasis and precipitate 
a crisis from within.
Future research of apocalyptic groups should examine the prevalence 
of apocalyptic followers within the ranks of traditional religious terrorist 
groups. Religious terrorist groups are not necessarily apocalyptic, but it 
may be possible that traditional religious terrorist groups host several 
followers who hold apocalyptic beliefs consistent with the groups 
examined in this article. For example, how many followers does a Shia 
terrorist group, such as Hezbollah, have that subscribe to the type of 
apocalyptic beliefs held by the Shiite apocalyptic terrorist group Soldiers 
of Heaven? Similarly, are there apocalyptic elements within al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates that subscribe to Sunni apocalyptic beliefs as Zarqawi did with 
AQI? Sizeable numbers of apocalyptic followers in these conventional 
religious terrorist groups could be ready to see events as apocalyptic 
signs, the herald of which might steer their actions away from their field 
commanders’ directions and toward fulfilling an apocalyptic agenda. 
Zarqawi and AQI often pursued their own agenda in this manner.
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Another area of future research should be on the apocalyptic group’s 
charismatic leader. Questions to examine in the future are as follows: 
Do charismatic leaders lose confidence in themselves as the apocalyptic 
group progresses? Do charismatic leaders experience some form of 
mental illness or addiction as the group progresses that make them 
susceptible to catastrophic action? Is there a relationship between the 
number of unfulfilled prophecies made by apocalyptic charismatic leaders 
and the time it takes the group to dissolve? Answers to these questions 
might help the security community better gauge their approach to 
apocalyptic groups.
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